Somalia is at risk as a result of the withdrawal of African Union (AU) forces. For starters, it may ease the strain on al-Shabaab at a vital point in the most recent offensive of the Somali government. The Somali government and the AU must take significant measures before the mission ends, but these threats cannot be entirely eradicated.
Al-Shabaab gains an edge on the battlefield and in the media as a result of the withdrawal of the AU soldiers. Additionally, it weakens support for Somali soldiers attempting an attack. Additionally, there is a chance that Somali soldiers stationed at former AU operating bases might be particularly open to attack by al-Shabaab.
In Mogadishu since March 2007, the AU Mission in Somalia ultimately expanded to a force of more than 22,000 people by 2014. The force was gradually reduced beginning in December 2017. It was given a new name in 2022—transitional force—signaling the end of the AU's military mission in Somalia.
Out of 17,500 peacekeepers, 3,000 should leave by the end of September as part of the subsequent drawdown phase.
The Somali government and AU soldiers must complete a number of crucial duties in order to guarantee a seamless withdrawal. Somalia needs to improve its internal security.
To manage the challenging logistics of the departing soldiers, the AU must work with Somali forces and collaborate with the UN. It would be interesting to speculate on what would probably occur when the AU troops depart if they both succeed.
Major tasks for Somalia
Finalising the design of their national security system is the main political task facing the Somali government. This has just undergone revision after being locked in draught form since 2017. It is vital that the nature and size of the forces, as well as the command and control arrangements and funding arrangements, are understood and accepted by the federal government and the member states of the federal system. Without the cooperation of the federal and regional governments of Somalia, offensive campaigns will be unable to be successfully carried out.
Second, Somalia and its regions need to increase their security staffing, particularly federal and municipal police officers as well as troops for the Somali National Army. The targets are to have 32,000 police officers and around 23,000 deployable soldiers. Resolutions passed by the UN Security Council in 2022 and 2023 explicitly recognised this. But deploying new, inexperienced people is not enough to win a war. The Somali army still lacks the necessary infrastructure, field mentorship, supporting equipment, and governmental structures.
Finally, before the AU force departs, the Somali government must make major strides in the fight against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab's defeat in five months, according to President Hassan Sheikh, is absurdly optimistic. Additionally, it serves no purpose by portraying the current offensive assault as a sprint rather than the marathon that it is. For more than ten years, keeping communities after al-Shabaab has been driven out has been the main military challenge, along with providing a genuine peace dividend to the local populace.
The main AU duties
To guarantee a smooth, staged departure of peacekeepers, the AU has its own set of challenging duties.
The AU's immediate aim is to locate and remove the next 3,000 troops by the end of September 2023 after withdrawing 2,000 troops in June. The troops will most likely come from the nations that have provided troops to the operation, including Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
To guarantee that the logistics operate properly, the AU must secondly collaborate with the UN Support Office in Somalia. The logistics problems are significant and require transporting soldiers and equipment using a large number of trucks and planes. The bulk of this action will be the transition of forward operating bases from the AU to the Somali security forces, possibly with some locations being closed. After the handovers, they will be especially susceptible to al-Shabaab attacks.
The AU transitional force must also keep assisting the offensive operations being carried out by the Somali Army on two fronts in central and southern Somalia.
The AU force must also continue its normal activities while getting ready for the third troop reduction, which is set for June 2024.
After the AU transitional force, what happens?
The AU force's mission will expire in 2025 if the transfer of security duties to the Somali government proceeds as planned. However, this does not imply that foreign forces will no longer be present in Somalia. When the AU force departs, it is doubtful that security assistance programmes and activities by the United States, Turkey, the European Union, and the United Kingdom would come to a sudden conclusion. At the very least, there will continue to be an international security presence in and around Mogadishu to safeguard the diplomatic community.
Likewise, Somalia's neighbours will not disband completely. In fact, early this year, Somalia's neighbours decided to send more soldiers to aid the federal government in fighting al-Shabaab, sending a clear indication of what life may be like without the AU presence. But it doesn't seem like this pledge has been carried out thus far.
Therefore, it is conceivable that the federal government of Somalia would sign bilateral security agreements with its neighbours. Additionally, it's likely that Uganda will be asked by Somalia to have a security presence in and around Mogadishu. Practically speaking, this makes sense given that Ugandan military have been battling al-Shabaab for more than 16 years.
Any other foreign nation would have an extremely tough time replicating it. In this case, Burundi's troops may be the only ones to depart Somalia when the AU transitional force's mission is completed. If true, the dynamics of this protracted battle would not significantly change as a result of this.
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